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September 2, 2020
The Honorable Randy McNally
Speaker of the Senate
The Honorable Cameron Sexton
Speaker of the House of Representatives
The Honorable Kerry Roberts, Chair
Senate Committee on Government Operations
The Honorable Martin Daniel, Chair
House Committee on Government Operations
and
Members of the General Assembly
State Capitol
Nashville, TN 37243
and
Mr. David Rausch, Director
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
901 R.S. Gass Boulevard
Nashville, TN 37216-2639
Ladies and Gentlemen:
We have conducted a performance audit of selected programs and activities of the Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation for the period August 1, 2017, through May 31, 2020. This audit was conducted
pursuant to the requirements of the Tennessee Governmental Entity Review Law, Section 4-29-111,
Tennessee Code Annotated.
Our audit disclosed certain findings, which are detailed in the Audit Conclusions section of this
report. Management of the bureau has responded to the audit findings; we have included the responses
following each finding. We will follow up the audit to examine the application of the procedures instituted
because of the audit findings.
This report is intended to aid the Joint Government Operations Committee in its review to
determine whether the bureau should be continued, restructured, or terminated.
Sincerely,
Deborah V. Loveless, CPA, Director
Division of State Audit
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Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
Performance Audit
September 2020

Our mission is to make government work better.

AUDIT HIGHLIGHTS
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s Mission Statement
That guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.
We have audited the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
for the period August 1, 2017, through May 31, 2020. Our
audit scope included a review of internal controls and
compliance with laws, regulations, policies, and procedures in
the following areas:
•

bureau management oversight,

•

Drug Offender Registry,

•

billing for the Sex Offender Registry administrative fees,

•

aircraft,

•

information systems, and

•

staff turnover analysis.

Scheduled Termination Date:
June 30, 2021

KEY CONCLUSIONS

FINDINGS
 As noted in the prior audit, management did not ensure that the bureau had
comprehensive, up-to-date policies and procedures, resulting in ineffective internal
controls in several areas (page 8).
 The bureau did not notify the National Association of Drug Diversion Investigators
when it removed drug offenders from the state registry, as required by statute (page
19).
 As noted in the prior two audits, the bureau did not provide adequate internal controls
in two specific areas (page 34).

OBSERVATIONS
The following topics are included in this report because of their effect on the operations of
the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the citizens of Tennessee:
 To ensure the bureau’s risk assessment addresses all potential risks and mitigating
controls, the Director should ensure that management understands the risk assessment’s
purpose and value (page 6).
 Management should improve controls over the Drug Offender Registry to ensure staff
accurately enter and appropriately delete offender information, and management
should document registry processes in the registry’s policies and procedures (page 17).
 The state’s court clerks did not comply with statute when submitting qualifying drug
offender judgments to the bureau (page 21).
 The bureau should consider additional information system controls to ensure the Sex
Offender Registry is accurate (page 27).
 Registering agencies are not following the bureau’s instructions for recording offender
fees (page 28).
 The Board of Parole did not remit the bureau’s portion of administrative fees or submit
indigent fee waiver forms (page 29).

MATTERS FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
The General Assembly may wish to consider statutory changes to reflect that the bureau
has no authority over those responsible for removing the state’s drug offenders from the national
database (page 21) and to improve the accuracy of the Drug Offender Registry (page 23).
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INTRODUCTION

AUDIT AUTHORITY
This performance audit of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation was conducted pursuant
to the Tennessee Governmental Entity Review Law, Title 4, Chapter 29, Tennessee Code
Annotated. Under Section 4-29-242, the bureau is scheduled to terminate June 30, 2021. The
Comptroller of the Treasury is authorized under Section 4-29-111 to conduct a limited program
review audit of the agency and to report to the Joint Government Operations Committee of the
General Assembly. This audit is intended to aid the committee in determining whether the bureau
should be continued, restructured, or terminated.

BACKGROUND
In March 1951, the Tennessee Bureau of Criminal Identification was established within the
Department of Safety. The organization was renamed the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (the
bureau) and became an independent agency in
1980. Tennessee law grants the bureau the
The bureau’s mission statement is
authority to investigate any criminal violation
“that guilt shall not escape nor
upon the request of the District Attorney General
innocence suffer.”
for the judicial district in which the offense
occurred. The bureau also has original jurisdiction
to investigate the following crimes without a formal request: fugitives; Medicaid fraud; electronic
victimization of children; organized crime activities; narcotics and drug violations; arson and
reckless burning; crimes involving employees or prospective employees of the bureau or the
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security; and investigations pertaining to domestic
terrorism that the bureau receives under a government information security classification. The
bureau also assists local law enforcement agencies in joint investigations and maintains the
Tennessee Information Enforcement System network, the computer information system for law
enforcement in the state.
For further background information on the bureau, see Appendix 3 for information on
bureau operations and Appendix 4 for the bureau’s organizational chart.

AUDIT SCOPE
We have audited the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for the period August 1, 2017,
through May 31, 2020. Our audit scope included a review of internal controls and compliance
with laws, regulations, policies, and procedures in the following areas:


bureau management oversight,



Drug Offender Registry,
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•

billing for the Sex Offender Registry administrative fees,

•

aircraft,

•

information systems, and

•

staff turnover analysis.

Management of the bureau is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective internal
control and for complying with applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures.
We provide further information on the scope of our assessment of internal control
significant to our audit objectives in Appendix 1. In compliance with generally accepted
government auditing standards, when internal control is significant within the context of our audit
objectives, we include in the audit report (1) the scope of our work on internal control and (2) any
deficiencies in internal control that are significant within the context of our audit objectives and
based upon the audit work we performed. We provide the scope of our work on internal control
in the detailed methodology in Appendix 5 and in Appendix 1, and we identify any internal
control deficiencies significant to our audit objectives in our audit conclusions, findings, and
observations.
For our sample design, we used nonstatistical audit sampling, which was the most
appropriate and cost-effective method for concluding on our audit objectives. Based on our
professional judgment, review of authoritative sampling guidance, and careful consideration of
underlying statistical concepts, we believe that nonstatistical sampling provides sufficient
appropriate audit evidence to support the conclusions in our report. Although our sample results
provide reasonable bases for drawing conclusions, the errors identified in these samples cannot be
used to make statistically valid projections to the original populations.
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

PRIOR AUDIT FINDINGS

REPORT OF ACTIONS TAKEN ON PRIOR AUDIT FINDINGS
Section 8-4-109(c), Tennessee Code Annotated, requires that each state department,
agency, or institution report to the Comptroller of the Treasury the action taken to implement the
recommendations in the prior audit report. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s prior audit
report was dated January 2018 and contained five findings. The bureau filed its report with the
Comptroller of the Treasury on July 31, 2018. We conducted a follow-up of the prior audit
findings as part of the current audit.
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RESOLVED AUDIT FINDINGS
The current audit disclosed that the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation resolved the
following previous audit finding concerning
•

the bureau’s lack of documentation
over its aircraft use and staff not
following the requirements in its
written policy.

We reported the results in the applicable section
of this report.

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUDIT FINDINGS
January 2018 Performance Audit
5 findings

September 2020 Performance Audit
Resolved 1 of 5 prior audit findings
Partially resolved 4 of 5 findings
1 new finding

PARTIALLY RESOLVED AUDIT FINDINGS
The current audit disclosed that the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation partially resolved
four previous audit findings:
•

The bureau’s lack of up-to-date written policies and procedures in identified areas and
not ensuring that staff followed existing policies
We found that management still did not include critical processes in the bureau’s
written policies and procedures (see Finding 1).

•

The bureau’s noncompliance with the Drug Offender Registry’s policies and
procedures
We found that management still did not fully implement controls over the registry and
did not document its processes in policies and procedures (see Observation 2).
Furthermore, county court clerks still are not submitting judgments or are not
submitting judgments timely to the bureau (see Observation 3).

•

The bureau’s noncompliance with the Sex Offender Registry procedures and lack of
sufficient procedures for invoicing registering agencies for fees
We found that management still did not fully implement controls over the database and
did not document critical processes in the bureau’s written policies and procedures;
furthermore, information system controls and noncompliance by registering agencies
contribute to the bureau’s issues (see Observation 4, Observation 5, Observation 6,
and Results of Other Audit Work).

•

Two of the four areas over information systems
We found that management still did not resolve two areas (see Finding 3).
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OTHER RELATED REPORTS
The 2017 Appropriations Act required the Comptroller’s Office to perform a
comprehensive review of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s accounting and budget
processes, as well as a general review of how the bureau should implement best practices in fiscal
management to maximize its effectiveness. A May 2017 letter from the chair of the Senate Finance
Committee provided additional details on the expectations for this comprehensive review. The
special
report
was
issued
in
January
2018
and
can
be
found
at
https://comptroller.tn.gov/content/dam/cot/sa/advanced-search/2018/tbi_special_jan_2018.pdf.

AUDIT CONCLUSIONS

BUREAU MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
To carry out the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s (the bureau) responsibilities, the
Director and management team must establish adequate internal controls to provide reasonable
assurance that the bureau can achieve objectives related to its operations, fiscal duties, and
reporting, as well as that it complies with laws, regulations, and policies. Effective internal
controls mitigate the risks of noncompliance, errors, fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition to
performing and documenting a risk assessment, it is management’s ongoing responsibility to
design, implement, and monitor effective controls as a way to mitigate any identified risks.
Risk Assessment
According to the bureau’s Internal Audit Director, she facilitates the risk assessment
documentation process and reviews applicable risk assignments. While the Internal Audit Director
serves as a facilitator, senior managers are ultimately responsible for reviewing their division’s
prior-year risk assessment; updating the assessment based on any new or revised policies and
procedures, as well as audit findings; and documenting the internal controls that mitigate the risks.
After the managers complete their divisional assessments, they submit them to the Internal
Audit Director, who reviews and submits all assessments to the bureau’s Director for approval.
Once the Director approves the completed risk assessment, the Internal Audit Director submits a
letter, signed by the Director, to the Commissioner of the Department of Finance and
Administration and the Comptroller of the Treasury notifying them that the bureau completed its
bureau-wide risk assessment and met its responsibilities relating to management’s internal
controls.
Policies and Procedures
As a law enforcement agency, the bureau is accredited by the Commission on Accreditation
for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). CALEA’s accreditation program gives public safety
agencies an opportunity to voluntarily demonstrate that they meet an established set of professional
standards.
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Exhibit 1
CALEA’s Professional Standards
Comprehensive and uniform
written directives that clearly
define authority, performance,
and responsibilities

Independent review by subject
matter experts

Community relationship-building
and maintenance

Continuous pursuit of excellence
through annual reviews and
other assessment measures

Preparedness to address natural or
man-made critical incidents

Reports and analyses to make factbased and informed management
decisions
Source: Auditor created based on information from CALEA professional standards.

Written policies and procedures are critical for the bureau to maintain its CALEA
accreditation and to fulfill its mission.
Results of Prior Audit
The bureau’s January 2018 performance audit report included five findings that indicated
management did not have sufficient controls relating to
 the appropriate use of the bureau’s aircraft;
 the collection of Sex Offender Registry fees from registering agencies;
 criminal judgment updates to the Drug Offender Registry;
 comprehensive, up-to-date written policies and procedures and compliance with
existing policies and procedures; and
 information systems.
In response to the prior audit finding, management concurred in part and stated they were revising
their policies and procedures.
Current Audit
For the current audit, we reviewed the bureau’s 2019 risk assessment and written policies
and procedures to determine if management had identified the risks and implemented effective
5

control activities for prior audit findings. We also evaluated management’s risk assessment as it
related to our current audit objectives.
Audit Results
1. Audit Objective:

Did bureau management identify fiscal, operational, reporting, and
compliance risks, as well as risks related to prior audit findings?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, we found that management only identified risks
related to prior audit findings and did not consider other fiscal,
operational, reporting, and compliance risks for the sections we reviewed.
See Observation 1.

2. Audit Objective:

Did bureau management identify and list control activities in their formal
risk assessment to prevent or minimize risk for each risk item?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, we found that management identified and listed
control activities; however, we determined that some of the activities were
either insufficient or ineffective to reduce the risks for the sections we
reviewed. See Observation 1.

3. Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did management have sufficient
written policies and standard operating procedures?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, management did not establish sufficient controls and
operational safeguards through its policies and procedures. See Finding 1.

4. Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did bureau personnel comply with
written policies and standard operating procedures?

Conclusion:

Based on our audit work, we found that bureau personnel complied with
written policies and procedures. However, we determined that staff did
not comply with state information system policies and procedures. See
Finding 3.

Observation 1 – To ensure the bureau’s risk assessment addresses all potential risks and
mitigating controls, the Director should ensure that management understands the risk assessment’s
purpose and value
An ongoing risk assessment process is a basic component of internal control. It allows
management to eliminate or mitigate the risks that could affect the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation’s (the bureau) overall mission, financial resources, or compliance with state law or
other regulatory requirements. The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government provide a comprehensive framework for internal
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control practices in federal agencies and serve as a best practice for other government agencies,
including state agencies. According to Principle 7.02, “Identification of Risks,”
Management identifies risks throughout the entity to provide a basis for analyzing
risks. Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of risks related to achieving
the defined objectives to form a basis for designing risk responses.
Management Did Not Identify Risks
Management did not expand the risk assessment to
include the bureau’s other fiscal, operational, reporting, or
compliance risks areas beyond what we reported in prior audit
findings. Management did not include pertinent risk areas,
including

“Management did not
expand the risk
assessment to include the
bureau’s other fiscal,
operational, reporting, or
compliance risks areas
beyond what we reported
in prior audit findings.”



noncompliance risks, such as removing offenders
early or late from the Drug Offender Registry;



fiscal and operational risks, such as duplicate
billings;



operational risks for aircraft, such as asset misappropriation or protection; and



security risks for information systems (see Finding 3).

We also found several instances where management identified receiving a repeat audit
finding as a risk, but they did not sufficiently identify the nature of the risks that caused the
deficiencies we reported in prior audit findings or observations.
Management Did Not Implement Effective Mitigating Controls
For the risks that management did identify, management did not identify and list effective
controls to mitigate risks for


the Drug Offender Registry (see Finding 2 and Observation 2);



Sex Offender Registry fees (see Observation 4 and Results of Other Audit Work);
and



information systems (see Finding 3).

For each area, bureau management provided the following explanations:


Drug Offender Registry – The Assistant Director of the Drug Investigation Division
stated that the division focused on the areas related to findings in the previous
performance audit. They did not consider any other risks related to the Drug Offender
Registry.
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•

Sex Offender Registry – The Accounting Manager in Fiscal Services and the Assistant
Special Agent in Charge of the Criminal Intelligence Division stated they were unaware
that they had not fully identified the risks or that their internal control was not effective.

•

Aircraft – The Internal Audit Director stated that she worked with the Aviation Unit’s
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) for months to complete the unit’s risk
assessment as it relates to bureau aircraft. The ASAC only identified one potential risk
resulting from the finding in the prior performance audit. The Internal Audit Director
also noted that most of the divisions focused on identifying areas related to prior audit
findings.

•

Information Systems – The Director of the Technology and Innovation Division stated
that he was unaware that the risk assessment did not identify risks related to the
bureau’s information systems or that the internal control was not effective.

Overall, based on our review and discussions with management and staff, the management
team did not fully comprehend their responsibilities for conducting a comprehensive risk
assessment for each area. According to the bureau’s Director and the Internal Audit Director,
management likely did not understand how to complete the risk assessment. Without an effective
risk assessment process, the bureau has a greater risk of not achieving its objectives, and its control
environment is weakened (see Finding 1).
The Director should ensure that management completely understands their responsibilities
to properly identify, analyze, and respond to the bureau’s risks. Management and staff for each
division should conduct a comprehensive risk assessment to identify risks within their division and
should design and implement effective controls to mitigate the identified risks. Additionally,
management should continue to address the risks we have noted in each new or repeated finding
or observation of this report and update the bureau’s risk assessment as necessary; assign staff to
be responsible for ongoing monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls; and act if deficiencies
occur.
Finding 1 – As noted in the prior audit, management did not ensure that the bureau had
comprehensive, up-to-date policies and procedures, resulting in ineffective internal controls
in several areas
To carry out the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s (the bureau) responsibilities,
management must establish the necessary operational processes for the bureau’s functions,
objectives, and goals. These key operational processes should include effective control activities,
including management’s own responsibility to oversee the processes. Control activities are the
actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond
to risks in the internal control system, which includes the bureau’s information system.
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Condition and Cause
We noted several areas, some of which we noted in
the prior audit, where management did not include critical
processes in the bureau’s policies and procedures:
Drug Offender Registry

“. . . management did not
include critical processes
in the bureau’s policies
and procedures.”

1. As noted in the prior audit, management did not update the Drug Offender Registry
Standard Operating Procedures and Reference Manual to include procedures on how staff
should document deviations between the registry and information listed on the court
judgments sent by the county court clerks (see Observation 2).
The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Drug Investigation Division noted that
management communicated the procedures to the staff responsible for updating the
registry; however, he did not remember to update the written standard operating
procedures.
2. The Drug Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures and Reference Manual did
not include procedures for a standardized supervisory review of registry information to
ensure the accuracy of the registry (see Observation 2).
The SAC stated that reviews of registry entries are difficult to conduct due to the limited
number of staff.
3. The Drug Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures and Reference Manual did
not include the bureau’s process of notifying the National Association of Drug Diversion
Investigators when offenders are removed from the National Precursor Log Exchange, as
required by Section 39-17-431, Tennessee Code Annotated (see Finding 2).
The Special Agent in Charge of the Dangerous Drugs Task Force stated that the manual
did not include notification procedures because his staff know the proper procedures for
uploading the data.
We offer that management should formally document all key processes to ensure business
operations can continue through unexpected change or personnel turnover.
Sex Offender Registry
1. As noted in the prior audit, the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry Standard Operating
Procedures Manual did not include written procedures for generating the monthly fees
report to ensure business operations can continue through unexpected change or personnel
turnover (see Results of Other Audit Work).
According to the ASAC of the Criminal Intelligence Unit, due to the small number of staff,
only one Intelligence Analyst is responsible for the monthly fees report. The registry’s
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written procedures do not include the process of creating the report because staff know
how to perform the task. The ASAC stated that the bureau is not required to generate the
report, but the process was created to address a prior audit finding about the lack of
sufficient procedures for fee collection and to assist the registering agencies with
remittance of the bureau’s fees. Additionally, she does not believe that the process needs
to be included in the standard operating procedures because the bureau has no power to
force the registering agencies to pay the fees.
While we agree that the bureau cannot mandate that registering agencies pay outstanding
fees, management does have responsibility to maintain sufficient policies and procedures
over the bureau’s operations.
2. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Fiscal Services Standard Operating Procedures
does not include the bureau’s process of following up on outstanding Board of Parole
offender fees or indigent fee waiver forms. Properly following up on the fees and waivers
forms provides management a record of outcomes for outstanding fees and waiver forms
(see Results of Other Audit Work).
According to the Accounting Manager of the Fiscal Services Unit, the follow-up process
should have been included in the standard operating procedures but was not. They will
review and revise the procedures to include the process.
3. The Tennessee Sex Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures Manual lacks
specific instructions to registering agencies about marking offenders as “indigent” in the
registry’s database system (see Observation 4).
According to the ASAC, the bureau provides registering agencies with ongoing training,
which includes verbal instructions to not use the indigent offender field in the registry.
However, the ASAC stated that future standard operating procedures may need to be
updated to include this instruction.
4. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Fiscal Services Standard Operating Procedures
includes the bureau’s process for following up on outstanding offender fees that registering
agencies owe; however, it does not include follow-up documentation requirements (see
Results of Other Audit Work).
According to the Accounting Technician of the Fiscal Services Unit, when staff members
follow up on past-due offender fees, they only retain documentation if the registering
agency responds.
Information Systems
Additionally, as noted in the prior audit, management did not follow state information
systems security policies and industry best practices regarding information systems controls in two
areas (see Finding 3).
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Criteria and Effect
The U.S. Government Accountability Office sets internal control standards for federal
entities through its Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book).
Green Book standards, which also serve as best practices for nonfederal government entities, give
management the responsibilities of
•

establishing an organizational structure;

•

assigning responsibility;

•

delegating authority to achieve the entity’s objectives;

•

developing and maintaining documentation of its internal control system;

•

designing control activities to achieve objectives; and

•

identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks related to achieving the defined
objectives.

According to the Green Book, control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques,
and mechanisms that enforce management’s directives to achieve the entity’s objectives and
address related risks. When management does not regularly reevaluate and update written policies
and procedures, these documents do not reflect the changes in personnel, processes, systems, or
regulations for which current management is able to take appropriate action when necessary.
Written policies and procedures do not serve their intended purpose when they are outdated,
incomplete, and unused.
Recommendation
Management has the responsibility to establish effective control activities, which includes
sufficient policies and procedures that ensure staff comply with state statutes, protect state assets,
and provide services to the state’s citizens. Providing clear oversight by establishing and enforcing
controls is one of management’s primary responsibilities. The Director should ensure that bureau
management understands the importance of comprehensive and up-to-date written policies and
procedures. Management should review written policies and procedures annually or whenever a
process changes.
Management’s Comment
In Response to the Drug Offender Registry
We concur in part with the finding. We were noting on individual judgments when a
correction was needed if information was sought from the applicable county court clerk. However,
at times the information missing from the judgment (driver’s license number, social security
number, etc.) would not be information to which a county court clerk has access. We have access
to different law enforcement databases to obtain missing information in order to enter it into the
Drug Offender Registry (DOR). We feel we are meeting our due diligence by obtaining the
required information, especially if this information is a requirement for the DOR. In addition, if a
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drug charge is coded as a misdemeanor on a judgment, but through our professional judgment and
experience, we know the charge is a felony, we make that change. Otherwise we would not be
putting correct information into the DOR. We have updated our processes and the analyst will
note any correction to the judgment, whether that correction is solved through a call to the
applicable county court, through a search on a law enforcement source(s), or a clarification on
distinction between a felony or misdemeanor. Any change is noted in a spreadsheet with
identifying information. This documentation is sent to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) on a
weekly basis. The SAC will note his review of this document as part of the Intelligence Analyst’s
alternative work solution (AWS) on a weekly basis. This documentation will be maintained for
review and audit purposes.
Regarding the recommendation of a SAC review of all registry entries, the SAC will review
the corrections made on a weekly basis. However, another analyst will spot check entries into the
DOR and document this in a monthly memorandum to the SAC. All of these procedures have
been updated in the Drug Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures and Reference
Manual.
We added the process of notifying the Executive Director of the National Association of
Drug Diversion Investigators (NADDI) when offenders are removed to the Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP). We have established a personal contact with the Executive Director of NADDI.
One of our Drug Investigation Division’s Intelligence Analysts emails a list of deleted offenders
from the Drug Offender Registry each business day. However, we have no authority over those
responsible for the National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) or the ultimate removal of
Tennessee offenders from the national database as required by Section 39-17-431, Tennessee Code
Annotated. We concur with the Matter for Legislative Consideration (noted on page 21 in the
audit report) requesting that the portion regarding notifying the NPLEx be removed.
In Response to the Issues With the Sex Offender Registry
We concur in part with this finding. The Tennessee Sex Offender Registry Standard
Operation Procedures Manual does not have specific instructions for marking offenders as
“indigent” in the registry’s database system. However, the bureau conducts regular training with
registering agencies regarding the registry’s database system and how to correctly update the
database. The SOR Unit also provides training for new users. The training includes step-by-step
instructions on how to register an offender and how to enter fee payment information. Even if the
Tennessee Sex Offender Registry Standard Operation Procedures Manual included instructions
for marking offenders as indigent, the bureau lacks the authority to limit the registering agencies
access to enter offender information in the database. The bureau lacks the authority because 4039-205(b) tasks the registering agencies with the responsibility “to verify the accuracy and
completeness of all information contained in the offender’s SOR.”
The bureau currently has Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for agency collection of
sex offender registry administrative costs. The SOP explains that the costs are annual, when the
costs are to be paid, the duty of registering agencies to determine an offender’s ability to pay, and
guidance on how to determine ability to pay. In addition, the SOP provides clarity on several
important issues surrounding the collection of the administrative costs. It is noted within the SOP
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that the costs are not to be waived without proof of indigency, the registering agency must
complete an “Indigent Fee Waiver Form”, and that the entire $150 fee must be collected at the
designated time. In addition, the SOP explains the procedures that registering agencies are to
undertake in order to record the payment of the administrative costs, both within the registry’s
database system and within the registering agencies’ own accounting. Lastly, the SOP spells out
the internal procedure that is conducted by the SOR analyst and the TBI Fiscal Services Unit each
month to assist in the remittance of the administrative costs to the bureau.
As noted in the last audit, Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration’s Policy
23 requires state agencies to “make a reasonable effort to collect all receivables on a systematic
and periodic basis.” The bureau believes that we have made more than a reasonable effort to
collect the annual administrative costs. We have exercised due diligence in assisting registering
agencies by establishing a procedure for the remittance of the administrative costs to the bureau
and by sending monthly billing statements based on the information that is provided by the
agencies. We are, however, limited in our effort by the information that is entered into the
registry’s database system. We lack the authority to audit registering agencies and must submit
the monthly billing statements based on what the registering agencies input in the database. As
stated above, the registering agencies are tasked with the responsibility to verify the information
in the offender’s SOR. The registering agencies are the appropriate entities to take on this task as
they are designated by statute to register offenders pursuant to 40-39-205(c)(1), submit the
bureau’s portion of the administrative costs to the bureau pursuant to T.C.A 40-39-201(b)(7), and
issue warrants for failure to pay the administrative costs pursuant to T.C.A. 40-39-208(5).
Public Chapter 668
We feel it is important to point out the bureau is no longer permitted to receive any of the
administrative costs paid annually by offenders on the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry. The
monies that were previously remitted to the TBI from the registering agencies are now designated
to the state treasury pursuant to the passage of Public Chapter 668. This became law on April 2,
2020. Public Chapter 668 amended T.C.A. 40-39-201(b)(7) and T.C.A. 40-39-204(b) and (c). The
amendment of T.C.A. 40-39-201(b)(7) removed the language requiring the remittance of the fees
to the TBI’s sex offender registry and substituted in its place the following language: “…with the
remaining fifty dollars ($50) of fees to be remitted to the state treasury to be deposited into the
general fund…” Likewise, T.C.A. 40-39-204(b) removed the language instructing registering
agencies to submit the remaining fifty dollars ($50) of the administrative costs to the TBI and
submitted in its place the following language: “…the remaining fifty dollars ($50.00) shall be
submitted by the registering agency to the state treasury to be deposited in the general fund of the
state.”
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DRUG OFFENDER REGISTRY
Pursuant to Section 3917-436,
Tennessee
Code
Annotated, the Tennessee Bureau
of Investigation’s (the bureau)
Drug Investigation Division is
responsible
for
using
information submitted by the
state’s court clerks to maintain
the Drug Offender Registry.
The registry’s purpose is to
prevent
registered
drug
offenders from purchasing any
over-the-counter or prescription
drug that can be used to
manufacture methamphetamine
(the bureau refers to these items
as immediate methamphetamine
precursors).
The registry
includes the offender’s name,
date of birth, county of
conviction,
offense,
and
conviction date. The registry is
available online for public
inquiry. 1

Timeline of Statutorily Required Activities and Changes to
the Drug Offender Registry
• Public Acts 2005, Chapter 18 created the
Methamphetamine Registry for offenders convicted of
certain methamphetamine-related qualifying offenses.
September 1, Offenders were required to remain on the registry for
seven years.
2005

July 1, 2011

July 1, 2014

July 1, 2017

• Public Acts 2012, Chapter 292 required all Tennessee
pharmacies to have access to the National Precursor Log
Exchange by January 1, 2012.

• Public Acts 2014, Chapter 732 expanded the definition of
"qualifying offense" to include non-methamphetamine
drug offenses and required offenders to remain on the
registry for 10 years. The registry was renamed the Drug
Offender Registry.

• Public Acts 2014, Chapter 732 resumes deletions from
the registry. Offenders eligible for deletion at July 1,
2014, are now eligible again.

The Drug Investigation
Division developed the Drug
Offender Registry Standard
Operating Procedures and Reference Manual (SOPs Manual) to provide guidelines to the Drug
Offender Registry Administrator and staff for updating and maintaining the registry. In
accordance with statute, management should remove offenders from the registry 10 years after the
offender’s most recent conviction date.
The division’s current process is designed so that when the Administrator initially adds
offenders to the state’s registry, the registry system automatically populates the 10-year expiration
date based on the conviction date on the offender’s judgment. Upon the expiration date, the
division’s Intelligence Analyst is responsible for removing the offender from the state’s registry.
At the beginning of each calendar year, the Intelligence Analyst runs a deletion report from the
registry system to forecast which offenders will be eligible for removal based on their expiration
dates. The Intelligence Analyst also runs a daily report from the registry that indicates which
offenders to remove. Additionally, the system automatically prompts the Intelligence Analyst if
an offender is not removed at the appropriate time.
1

The registry’s website is https://apps.tn.gov/methor/.
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National Database
According to Section 39-17-431, Tennessee Code Annotated, pharmacies must have access
to and use the National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) 2 before selling any immediate
methamphetamine precursors. NPLEx is administered by the National Association of Drug
Diversion Investigators (NADDI) and tracks sales of over-the-counter medications containing
immediate methamphetamine precursors. Pharmacists enter a customer’s information from a
government-issued identification into NPLEx. If the individual is found in NPLEx, the system
will issue a “stop-sale alert,” and the pharmacy must refuse the sale. The bureau is required to
notify NADDI at least every seven days of any person placed on the state’s Drug Offender
Registry. To accomplish this, the Drug Investigation Division’s Dangerous Drugs Task Force
analysts upload the updated registry information weekly to a secure system, which can be accessed
by the vendor that manages NPLEx.
Qualifying Judgments
Section 39-17-436, Tennessee Code Annotated,
County court clerks send the
requires court clerks’ offices to submit qualifying
bureau qualifying judgments,
judgments (convictions that require individuals to be
placed on the registry) to the bureau within 45 days of
or notices of convictions that
the judgment. Each month, court clerks submit
require individuals to be placed
qualifying judgments to the bureau by mail, fax, or
on the Drug Offender Registry.
encrypted email, and the Administrator reviews each
judgment to ensure it is complete and legible. If
information is missing or illegible, the SOPs Manual requires the Administrator to contact the
court clerk’s office or the district attorney’s office to obtain the necessary information. After
determining the judgment requires entry in the registry, the Administrator enters the required
offender information into the registry from the judgment sheet, which is retained in the division’s
paper files.
Section 39-17-436, Tennessee Code Annotated, also requires the bureau to maintain the
Drug Offender Registry based on information supplied by county clerks. The clerks must provide
the person’s name, date of birth, offense(s) requiring the person’s inclusion on the registry,
conviction date, and county of conviction. Additionally, the Drug Offender Registry Standard
Operating Procedures and Reference Manual requires the Administrator to enter other
information 3 for each registry entry.
On the first day of each month, the Administrator receives a report, generated from the
registry, that lists all offenders added to the registry in the preceding month. Using this
According to the vendor Appriss Health’s website, NPLEx is a real-time electronic compliance system that tracks
sales of over-the-counter cold and allergy medications that contain pseudoephedrine, which is a precursor to the illegal
drug methamphetamine. When states pass electronic tracking legislation, NPLEx is free for state agencies and its
users, including pharmacies, retailers, and law enforcement.
3
This includes information such as the person’s sex; race; Social Security number; indictment offense and
classification; amended charge (if applicable); offense date; drug code; statute for the conviction offense; sentence
imposed date; and conviction offense and classification. The public cannot view information that is deemed
confidential.
2
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information, the Administrator prepares a monthly summary report by county with the number of
offenders added. This monthly summary report is provided to the Assistant Director of the Drug
Investigation Division, the division’s Special Agent in Charge, and the Staff Attorney in the
Professional Standards Unit, who use the report to internally track which court clerks have
submitted judgments. The report also provides statistics as to the readiness of judgments for entry
into the registry.
Results of Prior Audit
In the bureau’s January 2018 performance audit report, we found that county court clerks
were not submitting judgments to the bureau within 45 days, information in the Drug Offender
Registry did not always match offenders’ judgments, and management did not have policies and
procedures in place to maintain the registry. In response to the prior audit finding, management
concurred in part and stated that they would review and revise the registry’s standard operating
procedures and that they would retain documentation of differences between the registry and
judgments.
Audit Results
1.

2.

3.

Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did Drug Offender Registry
management establish adequate internal control procedures to properly
maintain the registry and include such procedures in the governing
policy manual?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, management did not establish a documented
review process to ensure the accuracy of the registry and did not
maintain adequate policies and procedures to maintain the registry. See
Observation 2.

Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did staff ensure that the registry
information matched the information contained in the county clerks’
qualifying judgments?

Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that the registry did not contain the
same information as the qualifying judgments. See Observation 2.

Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did court clerks submit qualifying
judgments to the bureau within 45 days of the date of judgment, as
required by Section 39-17-436(d), Tennessee Code Annotated?

Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that some court clerks did not submit
any qualifying judgments to the bureau, and some clerks did not submit
judgments within 45 days. See Observation 3.
The General Assembly may wish to consider action for improving the
accuracy of the registry. See Matter for Legislative Consideration.
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4.

Audit Objective:

Did registry management establish adequate internal control procedures
to properly remove offenders from the registry, as required by Section
39-17-436(e), Tennessee Code Annotated?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, management did not establish adequate internal
control procedures to ensure offenders were removed from the state and
national registries. See Observation 2 and Finding 2.
Furthermore, we found that staff did not notify the national registry
when offenders were removed from the state registry, as required by
statute. See Finding 2.
The General Assembly may wish to consider changes to statute to
clarify the responsibility of the state for removing offenders from the
state and national registry. See Matter for Legislative Consideration.

Observation 2 – Management should improve controls over the Drug Offender Registry to ensure
staff accurately enter and appropriately delete offender information, and management should
document registry processes in the registry’s policies and procedures
Overall Effect and Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control
The Assistant Director and the Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Investigation Division
should evaluate the internal controls over the registry and include a documented supervisory
review in their written policies and procedures to ensure the accuracy of registry information.
Additionally, the policies and procedures should require staff to document and retain any followup with court clerks as a result of any incorrect or incomplete information on the submitted
judgments to validate any changes from the judgment information.
Without comprehensive written policies and
procedures and effective mitigating controls over
the Drug Offender Registry, the Tennessee Bureau
of Investigation risks not complying with statute
and allowing drug offenders easier access to
methamphetamine precursors.

“. . . the bureau risks . . . allowing
drug offenders easier access to
methamphetamine precursors.”

No Documented Review of New or Deleted Registry Entries
Based on our walkthrough of the Drug Investigation Division’s process for ensuring the
accuracy of the Drug Offender Registry information, we found that supervisors do not document
a review to determine the accuracy of registry information. According to the division’s
Intelligence Analyst, she performs spot checks for a small number of judgments each month, but
she does not document which entries she reviewed or whether she found any issues with the entries
into the registry. Although she checks the data in Microsoft Access to make sure, for instance,
that offenders’ birth dates or conviction dates were entered correctly, this review is not
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documented. None of the Intelligence Analyst’s informal processes are included in the registry’s
written policies and procedures.
Furthermore, division management
did not have proper internal controls over
deleting offenders from the registry.
According to the Intelligence Analyst, she
is the only person in the division with
responsibility to delete offenders from the
registry. She also stated that there is no
documented review or reconciliation
process to ensure deletions are made based
on and supported by the daily deletion
reports. Without this review, staff could
mistakenly delete offenders from the
registry or keep offenders on the registry
when they should be deleted.
Inaccuracies in Registry Information

Source: https://apps.tn.gov/methor-app/search.

Lack of Sufficient Policies and Procedures
As previously noted in the prior audit, we found that management’s policies and procedures
for the registry still did not include how staff document deviations between judgment sheets and
the registry. Specifically, when the county court clerks provide judgments with missing or
potentially inaccurate information, registry staff attempt to obtain information from the county
court clerks, the National Crime Information Center, 4 or other sources of information. Staff can
also use their law enforcement expertise when judgments do not contain explicit information.
However, registry staff did not always document their attempts to contact these sources or include
documentation of the updated information they successfully obtained to complete or correct
missing or inaccurate information. As a result, we found discrepancies between the registry’s
information and offenders’ judgments. Part of management’s corrective action plan for the prior
audit finding stated that they would include this data retrieval process in their standard operating
procedures, but we found that management had still not included the process in their established
manual.
Documentation Issues Involving Registry Information and County Court Clerks’ Judgments
We tested a sample of 50 offender judgments to determine if the Administrator entered all
information into the registry as required by state statute and the Drug Investigation Division’s
Drug Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures and Reference Manual. We also reviewed
these judgments to ensure that the information on offenders’ judgments matched the information
in the registry. From our testwork, we found overlapping issues with 3 of 50 judgments tested
(6%). For these 3 judgments, we found conflicting information between the registry’s information
The National Crime Information Center tracks nationwide crime-related data, which criminal justice agencies can
access online.
4
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and the offender’s judgment. Additionally, staff did not identify the source when they obtained
updated offender information when it differed from the original judgment.
•

For 1 of the 3 judgments, we found that the offender’s conviction class on the registry
did not match the information on the offender’s judgment. The county court clerk did
not list the offender’s conviction class on the judgment, and bureau staff did not
document the deviation on the judgment.

•

For 1 of the 3 judgments, we found that the registry’s listed statute for the conviction
offense did not match the statute citation on the judgment, and bureau staff did not
document the deviation on the judgment.

•

For 2 of the 3 judgments, the offender was assigned a felony or misdemeanor
indictment class in the registry, but the court clerks did not include the indictment class
on the offender judgment. By design, the registry’s system requires a selection of either
“felony” or “misdemeanor”; the field cannot remain blank. Additionally, for all 3 of
the judgments, we found that the offender’s felony or misdemeanor conviction class in
the registry did not match the offender’s judgment. For 2 offenders, neither “felony”
nor “misdemeanor” was listed on the judgment. The other offender’s judgment listed
the conviction as a misdemeanor, but the registry listed the class as a felony.

Overall Criteria
Bureau management is responsible for establishing internal controls over the registry. The
U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government (Green Book) sets internal control standards and is considered best practice for
nonfederal entities. Green Book Principle 10.03, “Design of Appropriate Types of Control
Activities,” states that management should divide key duties among different people to reduce the
risk of error, misuse, or fraud. Principle 12.02, “Documentation of Responsibilities Through
Policies,” states, “Management documents in policies the internal control responsibilities of the
organization.” Furthermore, Principle 12.03 explains that management should document its
responsibility for the objectives and related risks of operational processes, and that each unit should
document its policies to allow management to effectively monitor the control activity.
Finding 2 – The bureau did not notify the National Association of Drug Diversion
Investigators when it removed drug offenders from the state registry, as required by statute
Background and Condition
To achieve the reporting requirements to the National Association of Drug Diversion
Investigators (NADDI), management has designed the Drug Offender Registry system to produce
a weekly automated query that extracts only new and updated offenders’ names and information.
The system generates the report and emails it to the Dangerous Drugs Task Force. Analysts with
the task force then upload and send the extract file to NADDI’s vendor responsible for the national
drug offender database.
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Based on our review, we found that bureau and division management did not specifically
notify NADDI when staff removed offenders from the state’s Drug Offender Registry. Instead,
the bureau and division management consider the weekly extract file as the official record of
notification to NADDI of offenders removed from the state’s system. By considering this weekly
update of “new and updated offenders” as adequate notice of the state’s offender “removal,” the
bureau places the burden on NADDI to identify the actual offender deletions.
We also found that the bureau performs no other procedures to ensure that NADDI removes
Tennessee offenders from the national registry, as required by statute. Additionally, management
has not documented the current notification procedures in the Drug Offender Registry’s written
policies and procedures.
Criteria
According to Section 39-17-431(l)(l) & (2), Tennessee Code Annotated, the bureau is
required to notify NADDI when it removes an offender who is eligible for removal from the Drug
Offender Registry.5 When removed from the National Precursor Log Exchange, the person is again
allowed to purchase methamphetamine precursors.
Additionally, the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government, Principle 12.03, explains that management should document its
responsibility for the objectives and related risks of operational processes, and that each unit should
document its policies to allow management to effectively monitor the control activity.
Cause
According to the Special Agent in Charge of the Dangerous Drugs Task Force, he believes
the statute does not specify when staff should notify NADDI of removals from the registry. He
also believes the current process is sufficient since it is mostly automated, except when task force
analysts send NADDI the extract file. The Special Agent stated that the task force did not have
written procedures in place because his staff know the proper procedures for uploading the extract
file.
We offer that management should formally document all key processes to ensure business
operations can continue through unexpected events, changes, or personnel turnover.
Effect
By not providing the NADDI vendor with clear information on drug offenders’ statuses,
such as the fulfillment of their sentence under the law and their removal from the state drug
offender registry, NADDI may not promptly remove former offenders from the national database.
Without proper removal notification as the statute intended, the bureau increases the risk that
Tennessee citizens who lost the ability to purchase over-the-counter medications will not have
their rights restored.
5

Section 39-17-436(e), Tennessee Code Annotated, states that offenders are eligible for removal from the registry 10
years after their last conviction date.
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Recommendation
To ensure compliance with statute, bureau management should develop a formal process
for notifying NADDI when offenders are removed from the state registry. Additionally,
management should document the complete notification process in the bureau’s written policies
and procedures.
Management’s Comment
We concur. We have updated our process and now have established a personal contact
with the Executive Director of the National Association of Drug Diversion Investigators. One of
our Drug Investigation Division’s Intelligence Analysts emails a list of deleted offenders from the
Drug Offender Registry each business day.

MATTER FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
This performance audit identified areas in which the General Assembly may wish to
consider statutory changes to Section 39-17-431(l)(2), Tennessee Code Annotated, by removing
this portion of the sentence: “When notified, the person shall be removed from NPLEx”. Although
the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation is currently responsible for notifying the National
Association of Drug Diversion Investigators when staff remove offenders from the state’s Drug
Offender Registry, the bureau has no authority over those responsible for the National Precursor
Log Exchange or over the ultimate removal of Tennessee’s offenders from the national database.
Observation 3 – The state’s court clerks did not comply with statute when submitting qualifying
drug offender judgments to the bureau
Section 39-17-436(d), Tennessee Code Annotated, requires court clerks to forward a copy
of the qualifying judgment and the date of birth of the offender for all applicable drug offenses
within 45 days of the judgment. However, we found issues with certain county court clerks not
submitting the offender judgments to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation in accordance with
statute.
Court Clerks Did Not Submit Qualifying Judgments Within 45 Days
For 8 of 50 qualifying judgments we tested (16%), we found the court clerks did not
forward a copy of the judgment to the bureau within 45 days from the date of judgment, as required
by statute. The clerks forwarded the judgments to the bureau between 3 and 73 days after the 45day requirement had passed, for an average of 19 days late. See Table 1.
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Table 1
Late Drug Offender Judgments Submitted
From August 1, 2018, Through January 22, 2020
County of
Conviction
Wilson
Putnam
Wilson
Cumberland
Tipton
Dickson
Dickson
Sumner

Date of Judgment
1/10/2019
1/28/2019
9/21/2018
10/4/2018
10/31/2019
9/17/2019
7/19/2019
6/6/2019

Date Judgment
Received
5/8/2019
4/4/2019
11/21/2018
11/29/2018
12/26/2019
11/12/2019
9/9/2019
7/24/2019

Source: Qualifying judgments submitted by court clerks.

# of Days
Over 45 Days
73
21
16
11
11
11
7
3

Court Clerks Did Not Submit Qualifying Drug Offender Judgments
Based on our analysis of the monthly summary reports, we determined that three county
court clerks did not submit any qualifying judgments in 2018, and five county court clerks did not
submit any qualifying judgments in 2019. See Table 2. Additionally, we requested and obtained
documentation from the Administrative Office of the Courts that confirmed that these counties had
qualifying judgments.
Table 2
Court Clerks That Did Not Submit Any Qualifying Drug Offender Judgments
for 2018 or 2019
Calendar Year
2018
2019

Counties
Hancock, Moore, Pickett
Bledsoe, Dyer, Hancock, Houston, Moore

Source: Monthly summary reports created by the Administrator from data pulled
from the registry.

Court Clerks Submitted Limited Numbers of Qualifying Drug Offender Judgments
We also found that several county court clerks submitted very few qualifying judgments to
the bureau for entry into the registry. During calendar year 2019, the court clerks submitted an
average of 143 judgments. For the period January 1, 2018, through February 29, 2020, court clerks
submitted between 0 and 2,349 judgments. During this same period, 9 county court clerks
submitted less than 20 qualifying judgments, which appeared unusually low compared to the rest
of the court clerks’ number of submitted judgments. See Table 3.
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Table 3
Court Clerks That Submitted Less Than 20 Qualifying Drug Offender Judgments
From January 1, 2018, Through February 29, 2020
County
Bledsoe
Carter
Dyer
Hancock
Houston
Marshall
Moore
Pickett
Van Buren

Number of Judgments
4
15
2
0
1
13
0
4
3

Source: Monthly summary reports created by the Administrator from
data pulled from the registry.

According to the Intelligence Analyst for the Drug Investigation Division, county court
clerks are likely not submitting the judgments or are submitting the judgments late because the
counties are smaller. They operate with a smaller number of staff and have other responsibilities
besides drug offender judgments. According to the Court Clerk Liaison for the Administrative
Office of the Courts, most of these counties have newer clerks and staff, which may have
contributed to the issue.
When court clerks do not submit qualifying judgments or submit them late, the bureau
cannot ensure that all applicable offenders are included on either the state’s Drug Offender
Registry or, ultimately, the national database. Pharmacies rely on the national database to conduct
the appropriate checks; therefore, when information is not updated timely, convicted drug
offenders who should be prevented from purchasing methamphetamine precursors may be allowed
to purchase them.
Bureau management should continue to communicate with all county court clerks and with
the Administrative Office of the Courts to ensure all court clerks understand their duty to report
both accurate and timely judgments for inclusion in the Drug Offender Registry. The bureau and
the Administrative Office of the Courts should work with local court systems to consider how
various courts can share information more efficiently and effectively, such as a shared information
system or application. Additionally, the two entities should regularly work together to
communicate changes in statute and to train court clerk staff on existing registry requirements
under the law.

MATTER FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
Although the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation is responsible for maintaining the Drug
Offender Registry, the registry’s accuracy also depends on the efforts of court clerks and district
attorneys regarding the timely and accurate submission of the drug offender judgments. The
General Assembly may wish to consider how to improve the coordination between the county
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clerks and the bureau to ensure both the state and the national drug registries are up-to-date and
accurate.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY
The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s (the bureau) management uses the electronic sex
offender database to maintain the registration of all sexual offenders within the state. The Sex
Offender Registry section within the bureau’s Criminal Intelligence Unit is responsible for
maintaining the database. 6 According to the bureau’s most recent annual report, the Sex Offender
Registry section is also responsible for providing training and support to registering agencies,
including ensuring the accuracy of sex offender classifications and registrations.
The bureau does not have the authority to enforce sex offender registration. According to
Section 40-39-205, Tennessee Code Annotated, that responsibility falls to the registering agencies.
Registering agencies include sheriff’s offices, municipal police departments, metropolitan police
departments, campus law enforcement agencies, the Department of Correction, the Tennessee
Board of Parole, and any private contractor with the Department of Correction. Statute requires
registering agencies to enter offender information into the database no more than 12 hours after an
offender’s registration, and to verify the accuracy and completeness of all information contained
in the offender’s sex offender registration. Registering agencies are responsible for updating the
database with any changes relating to offenders’ information.
The bureau publishes information from the database on the Sex Offender Registry website
to ensure the public has access to accurate and up-to-date information. 7 According to Section 4039-201(b), Tennessee Code Annotated, the website’s purpose is to provide information about sex
offenders so that the public can adequately protect themselves, their children, and other vulnerable
populations.
According to Sex Offender Registry section management, as of May 1, 2020, there were
12,937 active registered sex offenders in Tennessee.
Sex Offender Registry Fee
Any individual convicted of a sexual offense
is required to report to a registering agency
periodically 8 and pay an annual administrative fee of
$150. The registering agencies must remit $50 from
each fee to the bureau for the maintenance of the Sex

Of the $150 annual
administrative fee that offenders
pay, the bureau receives $50 for
the maintenance of the Sex
Offender Registry.

The database is accessed through a non-public viewing website, which requires the user to be registered and
designated as a user of the database. The database was upgraded in August 2018 to streamline the process of initially
registering sex offenders, updating offender information, and noting if an agency collected fees from offenders.
7
Information on the website includes the offender’s complete name, as well as any aliases, date of birth, convicted
sexual offenses, address, race, gender, a recent photograph, and whether the offence was committed against a child.
8
The offender’s reporting frequency is dependent upon the offender’s conviction type, health status, and residence
status, as set out in Sections 40-39-203 and 40-39-204, Tennessee Code Annotated; however, all offenders must report
at least annually. Offenders pay administrative fees annually, even if they must report more frequently.
6
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Offender Registry; 321 organizations registered and collected fees from offenders as of January
30, 2020. In some cases, registering agencies determine that offenders are indigent and unable to
pay the administrative fees. If an offender is unable to pay, the bureau’s Tennessee Sex Offender
Registry Standard Operating Procedures Manual states that registering agencies must submit
indigent fee waiver forms to the bureau and may consider a variety of items as proof, such as pay
stubs, proof of unemployment, or Social Security benefits.
Our audit focused on the bureau’s billing process for its portion of the administrative
fee. See Table 4 for the bureau’s revenue sources.
Table 4
Bureau’s Revenue From Sex Offender Registry Fees
Fiscal Year
Fees Collected

Source: Bureau management.

2018
$374,050

2019
$385,708

The Bureau’s Fee Billing Process for Registering Agencies 9
At the beginning of each month, an Intelligence Analyst in the bureau’s Sex Offender
Registry section generates a monthly fees report based on queries from the registry’s database,
which initiates the process to collect the bureau’s portion of offenders’ administrative fees from
registering agencies. This report lists all sex offenders who were required to pay administrative
fees in the previous month. 10
Once the Intelligence Analyst generates the monthly fees report, the Fiscal Services Unit’s
Accounting Technician uses the report to invoice registering agencies. In the event the registering
agency has an unpaid balance from the previous billing, the Accounting Technician attaches any
outstanding invoices to the current invoice in an effort to collect the past-due amounts.
The Tennessee Board of Parole (BOP), which operates approximately 35 registering
agencies, accounted for 30% of registered offenders in calendar 2019. The Accounting Technician
also uses the monthly fees report to bill the BOP quarterly for the bureau’s portion of the
administrative fee. 11 The Fiscal Services Unit processes and records the fees when registries
agencies pay them.
Given that the Fiscal Services Unit has not successfully collected outstanding fee balances
from the registering agencies, the Accounting Technician also prepares a quarterly collection
report of all registering agencies that owe the bureau administrative fees. Fiscal Services Unit
management designed the report to include the invoice numbers, outstanding amounts, and number
of days since the invoice was created. As of January 15, 2020, bureau management had
outstanding uncollected fees totaling $59,342 from registering agencies.
During the majority of our audit scope period, this was the bureau’s billing process; however, as a result of the
enactment of Public Chapter 668, the bureau will be making changes.
10
Offenders excluded from administrative fees include incarcerated, incapacitated, juvenile, and indigent offenders.
11
As a state agency, the BOP is billed through an interunit journal entry in Edison, the state’s accounting system.
9
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Although management’s collection report does not include outstanding BOP items, the
Fiscal Services Unit does track unpaid BOP fees. The Fiscal Services Unit also uses the monthly
fees report to prepare a list of monthly
For calendar year 2019, the bureau had indigent fee waivers needed that BOP has not
provided a fee waiver. For calendar year
a total outstanding balance of $39,450
2019, the outstanding balance of uncollected
from the Tennessee Board of Parole.
fees from BOP totaled $39,450.
Results of Prior Audit
In the bureau’s January 2018 performance audit report, we found that the Criminal
Intelligence Unit and the Fiscal Services Unit either did not have written policies or did not comply
with existing policies. As a result, the units did not ensure the bureau received its share of fees
from registering agencies. In response to the prior audit finding, management concurred in part;
they stated that they would review and revise their policies but reiterated that they do not have the
enforcement authority to ensure the bureau collects its portion of fees.
Audit Results
1. Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did the Criminal Intelligence Unit
and the Fiscal Services Unit establish and implement written policies and
procedures for billing registering agencies for the bureau’s share of Sex
Offender Registry fees?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, we found that the Criminal Intelligence Unit did not
establish appropriate internal controls over its preparation of the monthly
fees report or update its policies and procedures for billing registering
agencies for the bureau’s share of the registry fees. While the Fiscal
Services Unit did update its procedures for invoicing registering agencies,
its follow-up procedures were incomplete. See Results of Other Audit
Work.

2. Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did Fiscal Services Unit staff invoice
registering agencies for the bureau’s share of administrative fees?

Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that Fiscal Services Unit staff generated
invoices from the monthly fees report and invoiced registering agencies
for the bureau’s share of administrative fees. However, because of the
deficiencies we identified in the registry database and monthly fees report
process, management could not prove, and we could not determine, if all
registering agencies were billed appropriately. See Observation 4 and
Observation 5.

3. Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did Fiscal Services Unit staff
attempt to follow up on past-due administrative fees from registering
agencies?
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Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that Fiscal Services Unit staff did not
document follow-up attempts or outcomes in seeking collection of
outstanding past-due fees from registering agencies. See Results of
Other Audit Work.
Additionally, we found that the Board of Parole had not remitted fees or
submitted the appropriate indigency forms, as required. See Observation 6.

Observation 4 – The bureau should consider additional information system controls to ensure the
Sex Offender Registry is accurate
Limitations on Reporting Capabilities
The Sex Offender Registry’s database was created to capture information on convicted sex
offenders, as required by the registry policies and procedures and statute. However, bureau staff
can only generate offender information from the registry based on a selected date in time.
According to the Assistant Special Agent In-Charge (ASAC) of the Criminal Intelligence Unit
(CIU), staff can access an offender’s profile at any time to see that offender’s complete history and
data. However, management is unable to generate either global historical reports (such as data
trends) or ad-hoc reports (such as population reports) for all offenders so that both internal and
external users, including those with audit purposes, can review and analyze the overall statistics
and trends of the offender population.
System Control Deficiencies
We found that the registry’s database does not contain appropriate edit checks, and as such,
registering agencies may not include necessary offender fee payment dates or be able to input
incorrect payment dates. Given the unmitigated risk
of these data input errors, both the bureau and the
Edit checks are programmed
computer controls that are built registering agencies are responsible for potentially
inaccurate and unreliable system data. We discuss
into a system to prevent users
how registering agencies contribute to this problem in
Observation 5.
from entering incorrect data.
For indigent offenders, when a registering agency submits an indigent fee waiver form, the
bureau’s Sex Offender Registry staff are responsible for marking the offender as indigent in the
database. However, as the system is currently designed, registering agencies have access to modify
this information; they could mark an offender as indigent without submitting the fee waiver form
and without the bureau’s knowledge. Conversely, they could mark offenders who can pay as
indigent, which could lead to the state not receiving these fees. Due to the lack of system controls,
management could not provide a reliable report of indigent offenders. Additionally, the Sex
Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures Manual does not include any instruction for
the registering agencies to not mark an offender as indigent in the database.
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According to management, in order to require registering agencies to enter the date the fees
were paid at the appropriate time and/or to prevent the registering agencies from making
unauthorized changes to the database, the bureau would have to request and pay the vendor to
modify the system. Based on our discussion with the ASAC, CIU management utilizes grant
funding to make updates to the registry, and such a change in the database would be costly.
Furthermore, according to the ASAC, the database’s current design and reporting capabilities are
adequate.
The ASAC also stated that the bureau has thoroughly instructed registering agencies, via
training with the bureau’s analysts and online training, to not use the field for marking the
offenders as indigent; however, she stated that they might update the standard operating procedures
to include this instruction in the future.
The bureau’s responsibility for information recorded in the Sex Offender Registry is
outlined in Section 40-39-204(a), Tennessee Code Annotated. The statute states that the bureau
should provide registering agencies with viewing and limited editing access, and the registering
agencies should enter original, current, and accurate data. Furthermore, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office’s Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, “Business Process
Controls,” Section 4.2, Critical Element BP-1, states that poor data quality can lead to a failure of
system controls, process inefficiencies, and inaccurate management reporting.
Recommendations for Improvement
The Sex Offender Registry provides critical information to the public, management,
registering agencies, other key stakeholders. Management should evaluate the Sex Offender
Registry database’s deficiencies and identify risks related to inaccurate updates to the database. If
they cannot make system design changes, management should establish other mitigating controls
to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data. Management should also update the standard
operating procedures to include clearer instructions for registering agencies regarding indigent
offenders. Finally, management should continue to encourage registering agencies to submit fees
owed to the state and to comply with all current and updated standard operating procedures.
Observation 5 – Registering agencies are not following the bureau’s instructions for recording
offender fees
When offenders report to a registering agency, they must provide any updated offender
information and pay an annual $150 administrative fee or provide proof of indigence to the
registering agency. When the offender pays the fee, registering agency staff are instructed to enter
the date of collection into the database. However, due to a lack of edit checks in the Sex Offender
Registry system (as detailed in Observation 4), registering agency staff do not have to enter a date
of collection or could enter incorrect information. Of 57 offenders invoiced in 2019 that we tested,
the registering agencies did not enter or update the date the fee was paid in the database for 21
offenders (37%). Sections 40-39-208(a)(5) and (b), Tennessee Code Annotated, state that
offenders who do not remit payment, if financially able, have committed a Class E felony. An
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offender violating this part will not be eligible for suspension of sentence, diversion or probation
until the minimum sentence is served in its entirety.
When registering agencies fail to enter or update the dates of offender fee payments in the
database, it limits the accuracy of the database and hinders the ability to identify potential
noncompliant offenders. Also, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation staff are unable to run complete
and accurate reports, such as the monthly fees report, from the database for analysis or billing
purposes.
According to the Assistant Special Agent In-Charge (ASAC) of the Criminal Intelligence
Unit, through standard operating procedures and annual training, the registering agencies have
been made aware of their responsibility for entering and updating the dates of offender payments.
The ASAC is not sure why registering agencies are failing to enter this information. The bureau
has no enforcement authority to require agencies to update database information according to the
bureau’s instruction.
Management should continue to instruct registering agencies on the appropriate way to
enter offender information into the registry. Registering agencies should comply with standard
operating procedures and instructions from the bureau to enter accurate and reliable offender
information into the database.
Observation 6 – The Board of Parole did not remit the bureau’s portion of administrative fees or
submit indigent fee waiver forms
According to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s standard operating procedures,
registering agencies must submit payment or original copies of indigent fee waiver forms for each
offender required to submit fees during the billing cycle.
Sexual offenders can register with the Board of Parole’s (BOP) registering agencies, and
BOP remits the bureau its portion of administrative fees through an interunit journal voucher.
Quarterly, the Fiscal Services Unit (FSU) Accounting Technician generates and sends the monthly
fees reports listing the BOP offenders’ administrative fees to BOP staff. BOP staff mark any
offender that is incorrectly included or that has an indigent fee waiver form and return the reports
to the Accounting Technician. The Accounting Technician forwards the updated report to the
Criminal Intelligence Analyst, who researches to determine whether the designated offenders need
to be removed from the monthly fees reports or whether BOP needs to provide any waiver forms.
Once the Criminal Intelligence Analyst completes his review, the Accounting Technician forwards
the Analyst’s determinations to BOP staff.
For 4 of 18 offenders (22%) tested, we determined that BOP did not pay the bureau its
portion of administrative fees in 2019. BOP marked these offenders as indigent (on the monthly
fees reports) for the following reasons:


the offender was registered in a different county,



the offender was in jail,
29

•

the offender was exempt from the fee due to Social Security disability, and

•

the offender was exempt from the fee due to Social Security retirement.

However, bureau staff told us that even though BOP staff marked these offenders as indigent, BOP
staff failed to submit indigent fee waiver forms for the offenders to the bureau.
According to the FSU Accounting Manager, the bureau provides standard operating
procedures and training to make the registering agencies aware of the need to submit payment or
provide indigent fee waiver forms; however, she is unsure why they fail to do so at times.
When BOP fails to either pay the bureau its portion of the offender administrative fees or
submit the indigent forms, the bureau has no authority to force the BOP (or its agencies) to pay or
submit waiver forms. As a result, the state loses out on revenue intended to fund the maintenance
of the Sex Offender Registry database and impedes the bureau’s ability to track and report the
most current offender information. Management at the Board of Parole should ensure that staff
follow proper procedures by either paying administrative fees or providing indigent fee waiver
forms to the bureau as required.
Results of Other Audit Work
Subsequent Event
On April 2, 2020, the legislature enacted Public Chapter No. 668, which shifted the
responsibility of submitting the Sex Offender Registry administrative fees from the bureau to
the state treasury. Instead of collecting fees to maintain the registry, the bureau will receive an
appropriation in the budget each fiscal year.
Since April 2020, registering agencies have been holding on to the fees as instructed by
the bureau, and the bureau is no longer billing the registering agencies. Statute is unclear as to
which state agency is now responsible for ensuring the collection of the fees. According to the
bureau, it is also unknown who will be responsible for collecting any outstanding receivables.
In the meantime, funds owed to the state remain at the respective registering agencies.
Due to the passage of this legislation, we are reporting the results of our other audit
work below for informational purposes only.
Internal Control Deficiencies Identified in the Monthly Fees Report
In the prior audit, we noted that Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) management did not
document the procedures for generating the monthly fees report in the bureau’s standard operating
procedures. In our current audit, we found that management still did not include the procedures,
and we identified additional control deficiencies related to the reports. We found that an
Intelligence Analyst is solely responsible for creating the monthly fees report, which includes
combining four query reports from the database and deleting any duplicate or unnecessary data.
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The Intelligence Analyst does not maintain original database queries or records of data deletions,
and she cannot recreate the data after it is altered. In addition, CIU management has not established
mitigating controls, such as a supervisory review or an independent reconciliation of data, to
compensate for the fact that the Intelligence Analyst has responsibility over the entire process.
These mitigating controls should occur before the Fiscal Services Unit (FSU) uses the monthly
fees report to invoice the registering agencies.
Lack of Documentation and Procedures for Collection of Past-Due Amounts
Upon receiving an invoice from the bureau, registering agencies should pay the bureau all
outstanding fees or provide indigent fee waiver forms when unable to collect fees from offenders.
According to the FSU Accounting Manager, registering agencies are aware of these
responsibilities; however, some agencies do not submit the fees or provide waiver forms. When
registering agencies do not pay the fees that are legally due to the bureau, FSU staff send those
agencies past-due fee invoices along with any current invoices. As part of our audit review, we
asked for documentation to support these collection efforts, but staff could not provide it.
According to the FSU Accounting Technician, she only retains the communication if the
registering agency responds. While the standard operating procedures include instructions for
when to follow up with registering agencies, they do not require staff to document either the
performance or the outcome of the follow-up. Without adequately documented instructions,
management cannot ensure all attempts to collect fees owed to the bureau have been made.
We also identified deficiencies where the bureau indicated that the Board of Parole (BOP)
did not submit the fees due to the bureau or did not provide indigent fee waivers forms when
offenders could not pay their fees. We asked for documentation, but FSU staff could not provide
us with evidence that they had followed up on outstanding fees or waivers, and management has
not included the process for collecting outstanding BOP fees or fee waiver forms in the unit’s
standard operating procedures.
To be good stewards of the state’s revenue, bureau management should pursue all methods
and document all efforts made to recover fees due to the state.

AIRCRAFT
The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (the bureau) owns
and operates two aircraft:
•

a Cessna 182 Skylane, purchased in February 1999; and

•

a Pilatus PC-12NG, purchased in September 2017.

Aircraft Uses
The Cessna 182 Skylane accommodates one passenger with two pilots and can be used for
crime scene documentation, pilot training, and limited surveillance. The Pilatus PC-12NG can
transport five passengers and equipment and is used for surveillance and gathering intelligence.
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The bureau also uses the Pilatus during time-sensitive and critical matters, such as homicides, child
abductions, kidnappings, prison escapes, and other case-related matters that require quick
transportation of bureau personnel to various locations.
In addition to law enforcement missions, the bureau also uses the planes for administrative
purposes, such as transporting personnel to conferences and training. According to TBI Written
Policy 8-6-006, which governs the bureau’s aircraft, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) of the Aviation Unit, in consultation with the Deputy Director, should consider several
factors when evaluating requests for the use of the planes:
•

whether the use is cost-effective in relation to alternative transportation;

•

the potential benefit to an ongoing investigation;

•

the safety of criminal investigators, officers, and the public; and

• any adverse weather conditions that may exist.
IRCRAFT USE
Records and Reports
The bureau uses ZuluLog, a cloud-based flight management system, to schedule flights,
create reports, view a plane’s maintenance history, and track pilot flight hours. Bureau personnel
prepare and maintain the following documentation regarding aircraft use:
•

Flight logs are prepared by the pilot at the completion of the flight to serve as the
bureau’s official written report for each flight taken. The flight log includes fields for
the pilot to document the date of the flight, the requestor’s name, airport information,
and aircraft flight hours. The log is designed so that the pilot can also include mission
details: the case file number; which division or region used the flight; and the mission
type (investigative, training, maintenance, or logistics). The pilot or the second in
command enters the information from these handwritten flight logs into ZuluLog.

•

Aircraft use reports are generated based on the data from the flight logs in ZuluLog.
The reports provide information for each quarter of the year and summarize the types
and regions of flights; which units and divisions used the flights; and the types of
equipment used during the flights. The reports serve as another level of accountability
and review of aircraft use.

Results of Prior Audit
In the bureau’s January 2018 performance audit report, we found that bureau personnel did
not follow certain policies and procedures for the use of bureau aircraft. Specifically, we found
flight documentation that was inconsistent and did not support the uses of the aircraft.
Additionally, the bureau’s policy did not require pilots to maintain passenger lists for each flight.
Management concurred in part with the finding and stated that they would revise the policy over
the use of bureau aircraft and implement additional procedures for documenting aircraft usage.
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Audit Results
1.

Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did the Aviation Unit properly design
and implement internal controls over the proper use of aircraft?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, we found that the Aviation Unit properly designed
and implemented controls over the use of the bureau’s aircraft.
Management established in the bureau’s Policy 8-6-006 that the Pilot in
Command should ensure that a passenger list is emailed to Aviation Unit
Chain of Command before each flight takes off. According to the ASAC
of the Aviation Unit, the unit solely relies on the aircrew to follow policy;
however, no one ensures that the emails containing the passenger lists
were received by the intended recipients before takeoff. In the event of
an aircraft incident, these passenger lists are vital; therefore, management
should evaluate the sufficiency of the control to determine the risks to the
bureau should noncompliance with the bureau’s policy occur.

2.

Audit Objective: In response to the prior audit finding, did the Aviation Unit maintain proper
records, including flight logs, for all flights?
Conclusion:

Based on our testwork, we found that the Aviation Unit maintained proper
records for all flights.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS
General Background
The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (the bureau) relies on various information systems,
databases, and applications to maintain information that supports the bureau’s activities. The
Technology and Innovation Division’s Information Systems Unit provides information technology
and desktop support to the bureau’s staff. The division is also responsible for the bureau’s
computer systems and network, which allows employees and other entities 12 access to the bureau’s
files. The Department of Finance and Administration’s Division of Strategic Technology
Solutions is also responsible for providing information technology and desktop support for state
agencies, including the bureau.
Results of Prior Audit
In the bureau’s January 2018 performance audit report, we found that the bureau did not
follow state information system policies and industry best practices regarding information systems
controls in four areas. Management concurred in part with the finding and indicated that they
would address the issues through policy changes, additional procedures, and new applications.
12

Other entities that may access the bureau’s information systems include staff from local law enforcement agencies.
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Audit Results
Audit Objective:

In response to the prior audit finding, did management follow state
information systems security policies and industry best practices regarding
information systems controls?

Conclusion:

Based on our review, we found that management corrected two of the four
areas. For the two remaining areas, management did not follow state
information systems security policies and industry best practices regarding
information systems controls. See Finding 3.

Finding 3 – As noted in the prior two audits, the bureau did not provide adequate internal
controls in two specific areas
The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (the bureau) and the Department of Finance and
Administration’s Strategic Technology Solutions (STS) did not effectively design and monitor
internal controls in two areas. For these areas, we found internal control deficiencies related to
one of the bureau’s systems where both the bureau and STS did not adhere to state policies.
Ineffective implementation and operation of internal controls increases the likelihood of
errors, data loss, and unauthorized access to department information. Pursuant to Standard 9.61
of the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Government Auditing Standards, we omitted
details from this finding because they are confidential under the provisions of Section 10-7-504(i),
Tennessee Code Annotated. We provided the bureau and STS management with detailed
information regarding the specific conditions we identified, as well as the related criteria, causes,
and our specific recommendations for improvement.
Recommendation
Management should correct these conditions by promptly developing and consistently
implementing internal controls in these areas. Management should implement effective controls
to ensure compliance with applicable requirements; assign staff to be responsible for ongoing
monitoring of the risks and mitigating controls; and take action if deficiencies occur.
Management’s Comment: Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
We concur. We provided the Comptroller’s office with our specific remarks in regard to
the recommendations made. Through policy changes, additional procedures, and new
applications, these issues are being addressed and will be monitored through the bureau’s
enterprise risk management.
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Management’s Comment: Department of Finance and Administration’s Division of
Strategic Technology Solutions
We concur. STS has revised certain processes and implemented additional internal
controls to further mitigate the risk associated with this finding.

STAFF TURNOVER ANALYSIS
Bureau Separation Statistics
Separations from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation include employees who died,
retired, voluntarily resigned, or had an expired appointment. Total separations for years 2018 and
2019 included 136 employees, 41 of which (30%) were voluntary resignations. Employees with
0 to 5 service years had the highest number of employee separations, accounting for 10% of all
separations. Retirements accounted for approximately 4% of the total separations. As of January
2020, the bureau had 575 employees.
Staff Turnover Rates
For Calendar Years 2018 and 2019
Fiscal Year
2018
2019

Separations
73
63

Average Employees
Per Year
545
548

Source: Edison, the state’s enterprise resource planning system.

Turnover
Rate
13.4%
11.5%

Audit Results
Audit Objective:

Did bureau staffing turnover indicate problems with the bureau’s operations
and inhibit its ability to meet its mission?

Conclusion:

Based upon our analysis of the bureau’s average turnover rates for calendar
years 2018 and 2019, turnover did not appear to indicate problems with the
bureau’s operations or inhibit its ability to meet its mission.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Internal Control Significant to the Audit Objectives
The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government (Green Book) sets internal control standards for federal entities and serves
as best practice for nonfederal government entities, including state and local government agencies.
As stated in the Green Book overview, 13
Internal control is a process used by management to help an entity achieve its
objectives . . . Internal control helps an entity run its operations effectively and
efficiently; report reliable information about its operations; and comply with
applicable laws and regulations.
The Green Book’s standards are organized into five components of internal control: control
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.
In an effective system of internal control, these five components work together to help an entity
achieve its objectives. Each of the five components of internal control contains principles, which
are the requirements an entity should follow to establish an effective system of internal control.
We illustrate the five components and their underlying principles below:
Control Environment

Control Activities

Principle 1

Demonstrate Commitment to Integrity
and Ethical Values

Principle 10

Design Control Activities

Principle 2

Exercise Oversight Responsibility

Principle 11

Design Activities for the Information
System

Principle 12

Implement Control Activities

Principle 3
Principle 4
Principle 5
Principle 6
Principle 7
Principle 8
Principle 9

Establish Structure, Responsibility, and
Authority
Demonstrate Commitment to Competence
Enforce Accountability

Information and Communication

Principle 13
Principle 14
Principle 15

Risk Assessment

Define Objectives and Risk Tolerances
Identify, Analyze, and Respond to Risks
Assess Fraud Risk
Identify, Analyze, and Respond to
Change

Principle 16
Principle 17

Use Quality Information
Communicate Internally
Communicate Externally

Monitoring

Perform Monitoring Activities
Evaluate Issues and Remediate
Deficiencies

In compliance with generally accepted government auditing standards, we must determine
whether internal control is significant to our audit objectives. We base our determination of
significance on whether an entity’s internal control impacts our audit conclusion. If some, but not
all, internal control components are significant to the audit objectives, we must identify those
internal control components and underlying principles that are significant to the audit objectives.
In the following matrix, we list our audit objectives, indicate whether internal control was
significant to our audit objectives, and identify which internal control components and underlying
principles were significant to those objectives.
13

For further information on the Green Book, please refer to https://www.gao.gov/greenbook/overview.
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Internal Control Components and Underlying Principles
Significant to the Audit Objectives
Risk Assessment
Control Activities Information & Communication Monitoring

Control Environment
Audit Objectives

Significance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2 Did bureau management identify and list control
activities in their formal risk assessment to prevent
or minimize risk for each risk item?

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3 In response to the prior audit finding, did
management have sufficient written policies and
standard operating procedures?

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4 In response to the prior audit finding, did bureau
personnel comply with written policies and standard
operating procedures?

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

2 In response to the prior audit finding, did staff
ensure that the registry information matched the
information contained in the county
clerks’ qualifying judgments?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

3 In response to the prior audit finding, did court
clerks submit qualifying judgments to the bureau
within 45 days of the date of judgment, as required
by Section 39-17-436(d), Tennessee
Code Annotated ?

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4 Did registry management establish adequate internal
control procedures to properly remove offenders
from the registry, as required by Section 39-17436(e), Tennessee Code Annotated ?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

2 In response to the prior audit finding, did Fiscal
Services Unit staff invoice registering agencies for
the bureau’s share of administrative fees?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

3 In response to the prior audit finding, did Fiscal
Services Unit staff attempt to follow up on past-due
administrative fees from registering agencies?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Bureau Management Oversight
1 Did bureau management identify fiscal, operational,
reporting, and compliance risks, as well as risks
related to prior audit findings?

Drug Offender Registry
1 In response to the prior audit finding, did Drug
Offender Registry management establish adequate
internal control procedures to properly maintain
the registry and include such procedures in the
governing policy manual?

Sex Offender Registry
1 In response to the prior audit finding, did the
Criminal Intelligence Unit and the Fiscal Services
Unit establish and implement written policies and
procedures for billing registering agencies for the
bureau’s share of Sex Offender Registry fees?
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Internal Control Components and Underlying Principles
Significant to the Audit Objectives
Risk Assessment
Control Activities Information & Communication Monitoring

Control Environment
Audit Objectives
Aircraft
1 In response to the prior audit finding, did
the Aviation Unit properly design and
implement internal controls over
the proper use of aircraft?
2 In response to the prior audit finding, did the
Aviation Unit maintain proper records, including
flight logs, for all flights?
Information Systems
1 In response to the prior audit finding, did
management follow state information systems
security policies and industry best practices
regarding information systems controls?
Staff Turnover Analysis
1 Did bureau staffing turnover indicate problems with
the bureau’s operations and inhibit its ability to meet
its mission?  

Significance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
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APPENDIX 2

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
Expenditures and Revenues for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019
UNAUDITED INFORMATION
Description
Fiscal Year
Expenditures

2018

Salaries and Wages
Employee Benefits
Travel
Printing and Duplicating
Utilities and Fuel
Communications
Maintenance and Repairs
Professional Services Third Party
Supplies and Materials
Rentals and Insurance
Motor Vehicle Operation
Awards and Indemnities
Grants and Subsidies
Unclassified
Equipment
Training
Data Processing
Professional Services by State Agency
Transfer Out

$ 34,562,620
14,821,149
709,431
25,027
44,136
265,717
420,724
5,287,253
3,551,097
306,904
313,402
2,703
671,287
587,734
9,418,718
449,530
4,114,352
13,297,777
202,248

Total Expenditures
Revenues

Expungement Fees TBI
TBI Fines for Convictions
Municipal Citation Bond Forfeit
Refund of PY Expenditures
Federal Revenue
Current Services
Interest Income
Interdepartmental
TBI Handgun Permit Fees
Licenses

Appropriations

Work Program Original Entry
Carryforward Unencumbered Balance
Expansion from Reserve
Supplemental Appropriation
Revenue Expansion (Federal, Other)
Motor Vehicle Management

Total Revenues

$ 89,051,809

$ 84,718,185

$ 2,373,296
509,796
1,429,336
5,000
7,681,788
17,983,422
(2,835)
2,743,956
724,005
374,050

$ 2,268,598
467,052
1,420,646
9,022,687
17,811,861
(7,615)
4,340,575
622,650
385,708

79,680,900
1,487,134
1,152,387
4,186,396
(202,248)

80,799,100
766,365
2,433,400
4,177,202
(1,367,268)

$ 120,126,383
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2019

$ 35,159,441
14,445,282
869,824
57,738
36,175
270,283
561,794
5,196,314
3,536,342
57,022
555,558
2,506
795,084
585,886
3,021,357
650,141
5,481,683
12,068,487
1,367,268

$ 123,140,961
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APPENDIX 3

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Operations
The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation is divided into the following eight divisions:
The Criminal Investigation Division was created to provide criminal investigation
expertise for the District Attorneys General and state and local law enforcement agencies. The
division is also responsible for investigating public corruption, human trafficking, fugitive
apprehension, and criminal official misconduct at all levels of government. This division is
composed of the following:
•

The Field Investigation Unit investigates everything from high-profile murders and
official misconduct of public officials to embezzlement cases and financial fraud.

•

The Fire Investigators respond to statewide incidents of fire that destroy property or
result in fatalities. They work closely with local jurisdictions to determine the cause,
origin, and circumstances of fires. Staff operate the Arson Hotline, 14 which is dedicated
to receiving information about suspicious and incendiary fires and is answered 24 hours
a day. Support for the hotline is the result of an ongoing partnership between the bureau
and the Tennessee Advisory Committee on Arson. 15

•

The Victims Services program ensures the victims and witnesses involved in bureau
investigations know their rights, the bureau’s investigative process, and the criminal
justice process, as required by federal and state law.

The Medicaid Fraud Control Division investigates and prosecutes Medicaid provider
fraud; patient abuse and neglect; and abuse or neglect of residents in nursing homes and “board
and care” facilities. 16
The Drug Investigation Division was created in 1998 in response to the General
Assembly’s concerns that a large percentage of crime in Tennessee was drug related. According
to Section 38-6-202, Tennessee Code Annotated, the division investigates, gathers evidence, and
assists in prosecuting “criminal offenses involving controlled substances, controlled substance
analogues, narcotics, and other drugs,” and it has “original jurisdiction over the investigation of
all drugs.” The division cooperates with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies such
as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Tennessee’s
United States Attorney’s offices. The division includes two task forces:

More information about the Arson Hotline (1-800-762-3017) is at http://tnarson.org/.
The Tennessee Advisory Committee on Arson is led by a board of directors consisting of 9 officers and 12 directors
elected from its membership. The committee’s purpose is to foster relationships between public and private fire
investigators; provide continuing education to its members; and support arson prevention and prosecution through the
state’s Arson Hotline.
16
“Board and care” facilities are assisted-care living facilities, which provide room, board, and other services.
14
15
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•

The Tennessee Dangerous Drugs Task Force is a collaboration between federal, state,
and local agencies 17 to reduce the availability and illegal use of harmful scheduled
drugs, including methamphetamine, marijuana, prescription drug diversion, heroin,
cocaine, fentanyl, and others.

•

The Tennessee Alliance for Drug-Endangered Children is composed of federal, local,
and state agencies that, according to the bureau’s fiscal year 2019 annual report, work
to “prevent drug related harm to children and rescue, shelter, and support Tennessee’s
children who suffer physical and psychological harm caused by the manufacture,
distribution, sale, and abuse of prescription drugs and alcohol.”

The division also has a leadership role in several programs that are integral to Tennessee’s drug
enforcement community: the Appalachia High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) task
forces; the Middle Tennessee HIDTA task force; the Gulf Coast HIDTA task force; and the
Governor’s Task Force on Marijuana Eradication.
The Forensic Services Division provides forensic science services for every law
enforcement agency and medical examiner in Tennessee. The division has a central laboratory in
Nashville and two regional laboratories in Memphis and Knoxville. The following units comprise
the division:
•

The Evidence Receiving Unit receives, inventories, distributes, and stores all evidence
submitted to the laboratory.

•

The Drug Chemistry Unit analyzes any substance seized in violation of laws regulating
the sale, manufacture, distribution, and use of abusive drugs.

•

The Toxicology Unit analyzes blood and other body fluids for alcohol, drug, or poison
related to traffic charges (such as driving under the influence) and other crimes.

•

The Breath Alcohol Unit administers and maintains Tennessee’s breath alcohol testing
program and certifies and calibrates breath alcohol instruments.

•

The Latent Print Examination Unit analyzes fingerprints and palm prints and compares
them with suspects’ prints.

•

The Firearms Identification Unit determines if a bullet, cartridge case, or other
ammunition was fired from a particular weapon.

•

The Microanalysis Unit examines and compares evidence involving fire debris,
impressions, paint, glass, fiber, and gunshot residue.

•

The Forensic Biology Unit identifies and characterizes blood and other body fluids to
determine whether they are related to a crime.

The task force’s executive board is composed of representatives from the following organizations: Tennessee
sheriffs; Tennessee chiefs of police; directors of judicial district drug task forces; District Attorneys General;
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation; Tennessee Highway Patrol; Tennessee National Guard Counterdrug Task Force;
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services; Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security; Tennessee
Department of Health; Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services; Drug Enforcement
Administration; Tennessee United States Attorney’s offices; and Tennessee Department of Correction.

17
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•

The Combined DNA Index System Unit enables evidentiary DNA profiles to be
searched against the database of convicted offenders and arrestees.

•

The Violent Crime Response Teams are three regionally located vehicles equipped with
advanced forensic equipment for homicide crime scenes.

The Technology and Innovation Division’s units deliver the following services to the
bureau’s other divisions, as well as to local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies and to the
public:
•

The Information Systems Unit runs the bureau’s data center and business technology;
manages critical communications; and creates, deploys, and maintains systems for all
of the bureau’s components and many external customers.

•

Technical Services Unit agents investigate a range of online harms, including internet
crimes against children, life-threatening communication online, cyber-enabled fraud,
and computer intrusions. The unit also deploys and gathers evidence from advanced
technologies, including digital forensic analysis and communications and geolocation
evidence, for the bureau’s special agents and the Tennessee law enforcement
community. Agents assigned to the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force open
dozens of cases related to identity theft, cyber scams, and the manufacturing and
distribution of child pornography. The unit also assists with mobile command and
radio communications.

•

The Criminal Intelligence Unit is responsible for compiling, analyzing, and sharing
statewide criminal intelligence, with an emphasis on organized crime, fugitives,
terrorists, gang activity, missing children, sex offenders, and human trafficking. The
employees assigned to this unit manage Tennessee’s Fusion Center, the state’s
AMBER Alert program, the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry, and the bureau’s Most
Wanted Program.

The Criminal Justice Information Services Division serves as the liaison between all
state law enforcement agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The division houses the
state repository of criminal history records, supports criminal justice information traffic, conducts
background checks for gun purchasers, and performs the following other duties:
•

The Tennessee Instant Check System Unit processes point-of-sale background checks,
which are required by law for firearm purchases, by accessing state and federal
databases.

•

The Tennessee Information Enforcement System Unit provides state and local law
enforcement with information from the National Crime Information Center. 18

•

The Tennessee Incident Based Reporting System Unit collects and reports all crime
data required by law.

This database maintains files on wanted persons; protection orders; deported felons; people who may pose a threat
to the president or others afforded protection by the U.S. Secret Service; foreign fugitives; people under supervision
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; convicted offenders on supervised release; and the Sex Offender Registry.
18
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•

The Biometrics Services Center houses three units:
o The Fee Programs Unit processes and maintains the fingerprint-based criminal
records database. This includes the Tennessee Application Process System,
which provides criminal histories to employers based on applicants’
fingerprints, and Tennessee Open Records Information Services, 19 which
allows the bureau to provide third-party vendors with state criminal history for
background checks.
o The Criminal Records Unit processes expungement orders; 20 background
checks for people under consideration for pre-trial or judicial diversions; and
final court dispositions.
o The Data Quality Unit updates the Automated Fingerprint Identification System
with fingerprint submissions.

The Administrative Services Division provides technical and administrative support to
all areas of the bureau and includes the following:
•

The mission of the Internal Audit Office is to provide independent, objective assurance
and consulting. Its scope of work includes risk management, internal control,
compliance, efficiency, and process improvement. In addition, the office is responsible
for ensuring the bureau maintains compliance with Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies and Tennessee Law Enforcement Accreditation standards.

•

The Professional Standards Unit is responsible for legislative issues, internal affairs,
and legal functions. The staff of attorneys ensures that the bureau’s policies, decisions,
and contracts are legally sound.

•

The Human Resources Unit provides services in recruitment; onboarding; employee
relations; leave and attendance; performance management; and classification and
compensation. The unit also provides technical support for processing payroll,
benefits, worker’s compensation, and other transactions for employees. The Assistant
Director of Talent Management implements and serves as the Coordinator of the Title
VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

•

The Fiscal Services Unit supports the bureau by preparing the budget; monitoring
expenditures and revenues; processing accounts receivable and payable transactions;
purchasing goods and services; and maintaining grants.

•

The Executive Officer implements special projects and oversees naloxone 21
distribution.

•

The Protective Services Unit (formally the Uniformed Officer section) was placed in
the Administrative Services Division in April 2019. The officers are responsible for

Tennessee Open Records Information Services background checks are only name-based checks; they provide
Tennessee criminal history information to the requestor and do not involve the submission of fingerprints.
20
Expungement orders are orders from criminal courts to remove specific information from an individual’s criminal
history.
21
Nalaxone is used to treat emergency opioid overdoses.
19
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the physical security of the bureau facilities, personnel, and all guests at the facilities.
Additional duties include conducting background investigations for both full-time and
temporary employees, interns, contract personnel, vendors, certain Tennessee
Education Lottery employees, and all Governor appointments. The officers are also
trained as certified emergency medical technicians capable of providing aid and
comfort to the sick and injured persons on bureau properties until additional medical
help and emergency transportation arrives.
•

The Public Information Office is the central point of communication between the
bureau and the public. The staff in this office act as the point of contact for the media.

The mission of the Training Division is to provide oversight, guidance, and inspiration
through excellence in training and research. The division’s staff design, develop, revise, and
implement the bureau’s training programs to ensure that bureau personnel receive the training they
require to perform their duties safely and effectively. More than 17,000 members of Tennessee
law enforcement take these classes. The division also runs the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s
(TBI) Special Agent Academy, which is attended by all new special agents and personnel from
several other state-level investigative agencies. The division’s training and support services also
include the following:
•

The Tennessee Leaders of Tomorrow Internship Program is an unpaid internship
opportunity for full-time college students who are interested in a criminal justice or
forensic career and are pursuing a degree from an accredited college or university.

•

The TBI State Academy provides advanced training courses in leadership,
constitutional law, communications intelligence, financial investigations, and
undercover investigations.

•

The TBI Leadership Academy was created to enhance leadership training for
Tennessee law enforcement executives.

•

The TBI Director’s Academy provides the bureau’s future leaders with pre-supervisory
leadership training.

•

The TBI Citizens’ Academy was designed to provide the public with a better
understanding and awareness of the bureau through a hands-on approach.

•

The TBI Peer Support Services program trains and allows bureau staff to obtain
certification in critical incident stress debriefing, which allows them to provide
intervention services to bureau staff who experience an event that overwhelms their
usual effective coping abilities.22 The bureau partnered with the Tennessee Public
Safety Network to create this program.

The bureau’s business unit code in Edison is 348.00.

For more information on the program, see
http://tennesseepublicsafetynetwork.com/critical_incident_stress_debriefings.html.
22
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APPENDIX 4

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Organizational Chart
February 2020

SAC – Special Agent in Charge
ASAC – Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Source: Tennessee Bureau of Investigation management.
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APPENDIX 5

Audit Methodologies

BUREAU MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
To gain an understanding of and to document management’s process for preparing the risk
assessment, we interviewed the Director and the Internal Audit Director. We reviewed the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s 2019 risk assessment and the risks management identified for
the prior audit findings and the current audit objectives.
We obtained and reviewed the bureau’s written policies and standard operating procedures
that were relevant to our audit objectives. We performed interviews and walkthroughs, and
observed staff performing their job duties. For each audit area, we inspected documentation as
part of our testwork. We compared the results of our audit work to our expectations based on the
written policies and procedures and our understanding of management’s processes. Our objectives
and testwork in each area are described in further detail in the applicable sections of our report.

DRUG OFFENDER REGISTRY
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
control as it relates to audit objectives 1 through 4, we interviewed management to obtain an
understanding of relevant internal controls and performed walkthroughs, reviews of relevant
policies and procedures, and testwork of management’s control activities.
To determine whether management’s procedures were sufficient to accurately maintain the
registry, and to ensure that offenders were appropriately deleted from the state and national
registries, we obtained and reviewed the Drug Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures
and Reference Manual (SOPs Manual) and applicable registry law; interviewed key bureau
personnel; and performed walkthroughs of the control procedures.
We also obtained a list of new offenders’ judgments from the registry for the period August
1, 2018, through January 22, 2020. To determine whether the registry’s information matched the
qualifying judgments provided by the court clerks, we tested a nonstatistical, random sample of 25
judgments from a population of 10,160 judgments. We also tested a nonstatistical, haphazard
sample of 25 qualifying judgments from the paper files to determine whether the information on
the judgment sheets matched the information in the registry. We tested all 50 judgments for
compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated and the SOPs Manual and to determine whether court
clerks submitted qualifying judgments to the bureau within 45 days, as required by Section 39-17436(d), Tennessee Code Annotated.
We obtained and analyzed the monthly summary reports from January 1, 2018, through
February 29, 2020, to determine whether court clerks submitted qualifying judgments to the bureau
as required by Section 39-17-436(d), Tennessee Code Annotated.
We obtained a list of offenders deleted from the registry for the period August 1, 2018,
through January 22, 2020. To determine whether staff properly deleted the offenders and
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maintained deletion documentation, we selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 10 offenders
from a population of 538 offenders. We also selected a nonstatistical, haphazard sample of 10
names on the daily deletion report paper files to determine whether the deletion actually
occurred. 23 We used the same sample of offenders to test whether the offenders were properly
removed from the NPLEx, in accordance with Section 39-17-436(e), Tennessee Code Annotated.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
control as it relates to audit objectives 1, 2, and 3, we interviewed management to obtain an
understanding of relevant internal controls, performed walkthroughs, reviewed relevant policies
and procedures, and performed testwork of management’s control activities.
We reviewed the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry Standard Operating Procedures
Manual, dated November 30, 2015, and applicable registry laws; interviewed key personnel; and
performed walkthroughs of the Criminal Intelligence Unit and the Fiscal Services Unit procedures.
We obtained the Criminal Intelligence Unit’s monthly fees reports for 2019 to establish a
population of offender administrative fees. From a population of 12,646 offender administrative
fees, consisting of 3,798 Board of Parole (BOP) fees and 8,848 other registering agency fees, we
selected a nonstatistical, random sample of 18 from BOP and 42 from other registering agencies.
We tested this sample of 60 offender administrative fees to determine whether the Fiscal Services
Unit followed the standard operating procedures for invoicing registering agencies for the bureau’s
share of administrative fees, and whether they attempted to follow up on past-due fees with
registering agencies and BOP.
From our review of the Sex Offender Registry database and discussions with bureau
management and staff, we determined that management could not provide us with complete and
reliable fee and/or indigent form data for audit testwork; therefore, we could not expand our audit
testwork and concluded based on the testwork we were able to complete.

AIRCRAFT
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
control as it relates to audit objectives 1 and 2, we interviewed management to obtain an
understanding of relevant internal controls, performed walkthroughs, reviewed relevant policies
and procedures, and performed testwork of management’s control activities. To obtain an
understanding of the procedures for management and staff to use bureau aircraft, we reviewed TBI
Written Policy 8-6-006, “TBI Aircraft,” and interviewed the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of
the Aviation Unit. We also obtained a population of 197 flights recorded on the ZuluLog flight
list during the period January 1, 2019, through January 22, 2020. We selected a random sample
of 5 logistics flights, 5 investigative operations flights, 5 maintenance flights, and 5 training flights.
We reviewed the flight logs, requests, and passenger lists to determine if bureau management used
We originally planned to test 20 offenders that were deleted from the registry, but due to extenuating circumstances
we were only able to test 16. We believe our conclusions are still appropriate based on the results of the 16 offenders
tested.
23
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the bureau’s aircraft in accordance with its policies and procedures.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS
To assess management’s design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of internal
control, we interviewed management to obtain an understanding of relevant internal controls,
performed walkthroughs, reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and performed testwork of
management’s control activities.

STAFF TURNOVER ANALYSIS
To gain an understanding of turnover trends, we reviewed the bureau’s overall turnover
rates and analyzed turnover rates by division and job title to find any outliers.
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